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LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF
ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL CONFESSIONS*
T HE rule of evidence prohibiting the admission in criminal cases
of evidence elicited from the accused by coercion or undue in-
fluence is well settled.' However, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court during the past few years show a decided trend
towards a new and broader interpretation of the factors constitut-
ing coercion and undue influence.
The recent trend in the attitude of the Court regarding confes-
sions is bottomed upon a series of cases decided between 1936 and
1942 involving convictions in several southern states of negroes
accused of rape or murder of white victims. In each instance the
Court very properly decided that the police tactics employed in
obtaining the confessions, and the court use of the confessions based
thereon, constituted a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The first of
these cases, Brown v. Mississipmi,2 involved actual physical abuse of
the defendants who, while under suspicion of murder, were severely
beaten by the police immediately before confessing. The confes-
sions thus obtained constituted the sole evidence against them. In
the next case, Chambers v. Floridas the defendants were not physi-
cally abused as in the Brown case but were intensively questioned
as murder suspects for a week. The culmination point was an all
night session of continuous interrogation, and the taking of several
written confessions until one was obtained from the defendants
which was considered "worth while" by the county prosecutor. The
Supreme Court reversed the case on the ground that the use of con-
fessions thus obtained constituted a violation of due process of law.
For similar reasons, and upon somewhat analogous facts, the Su-
preme Court reversed the state convictions in the cases of White v.
Texas4 and Ward v. Texas5.
In the foregoing cases the Supreme Court applied the conventional
and accepted test inquiring into the voluntary nature or the trust-
* By Ellis E. Fuqua, Junior Law Student, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law.
1 For an analysis of this field generally, see Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed., 1940) § § 815-867; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed., 1935)
§ 591 et seq.
2 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
3 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
4 310 U. S. 530 (1940). A farm hand accused of rape was held in
custody for a week. On several nights he was taken from the jail out
into the woods for questioning, and on the last night interrogated in a
locked elevator in the jail house. The Court held that the circumstances
were such that the confession could not be considered as trustworthy.
5 316 U. S. 547 (1942). The Court reversed a murder conviction
resting on a confession made by the accused after he had been arrested
without a warrant, moved from county to county for two days on the
pretense of avoiding mob violence, and questioned continuously. The
Court held that although each state has the right to prescribe the tests
governing the admissibility of confessions, yet when the federal question
of due process has been raised the Supreme Court cannot be precluded
by the verdict of the jury from determining whether the circumstances
under which the confession was made were such that its admission in
evidence would amount to a denial of due process.
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worthiness of the confessions.8 The wisdom of these decisions can-
not be questioned. Such practice on the part of police officers cannot
be condoned and confessions thus obtained can neither be regarded
as voluntary nor trustworthy. However, in 1944 the Supreme Court
went further than it had in any previous decisions and indicated a
decided tendency towards more severe restrictions upon law en-
forcement officers. In the case of Ashcraft v. TennesseeT the Court
laid down a test of admissibility based upon whether or not the
conditions and circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
fession were "inherently coercive." In applying that test the court
held inadmissible a confession obtained from the defendant after
he had been held incommunicado for thirty-six hours without rest
or sleep.
Justice Jackson wrote a strong dissenting opinion in the Ashcraft
cases in which he pointed out that arrest itself, as well as custody
and examination even for one hour, is "inherently coercive"; that,
of course such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer ques-
tions, to answer them truthfully, and to confess if guilty. Thus he
felt that the -"inherently coercive" doctrine, as established by the
majority opinion, was too strict and in direct conflict with the pre-
viously accepted rule that a confession is admissible if not obtained
by acts or threats of violence or promises of benefits so as to render
the confession untrustworthy.
Unfortunately Justice Jackson's arguments seem to have had lit-
tle effecf upon the majority of the Court, for in the case of Lyons v.
Oklahoma,9 decided soon thereafter, the Court held that if a confes-
sion which is found to have been illegally obtained is introduced at
the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though
the evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient
to sustain the jury's verdict.10
The Supreme Court had thus departed fropn the generally ac-
cepted test of admissibility when the recent case of Malinski et al v.
New York" arose. The defendant was arrested as a suspect for the
murder of a police officer during a robbery. He was taken to a
hotel and questioned by the police for a period of four days. His
6 The usually accepted tests of admissibility is voluntariness, which
is determined in a preliminary hearing by the trial judge out of the
presence of the jury, and in some states if the confession is admitted,
the defendant may present evidence concerning the alleged coercion for
the jury to consider in determining the credibility of the confession.
People v. Fox, 319 Ill. 606, 150 N.E. 347 (1926). Other states have held
that the question of voluntariness is for the jury under proper instruc-
tions. People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927). See note
85 A.L.R. 870 (1933) and extensive article on "The Scope of Privilege",
McCormick (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 451, et seq. However, as Dean
Wigmore points out the test of voluntariness seems to be too indefinite.
The better test would seem to be "Was the situation one likely to lead
to an untrue confession?" Such a test seems to be sufficient to protect
the innocent person from false prosecution and yet to give the police
sufficient leeway so that the guilty may be brought to justice. Wigmore,
Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) § § 823-827; 2266.
7 322 U. S. 143 (1944). Note (1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev. 919.
8 322 U. S. 143, 156 (1944).
9 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
10 The court, however, affirmed the conviction on the fact situation.
The accused made an involuntary, coerced confession followed twelve
hours later by the confession in question which was made in the pres-
ence of other officers whom he had no occasion to fear.
11 - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 781 (1945). See notes (1944) 20 N. Y.
U.L.Q.R. 236; (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 660.
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clothes were taken away for a few hours during the first day; how-
ever, there was nothing to show that he was beaten or threatened
while he was being held at the hotel. During the first day he made
an oral confession, and on the fourth day, upon being taken bto[the
police station, he was arraigned after signing a written confession.
At the trial the written confession, as well as his own admissions of
guilt to several other witnesses, was introduced in evidence. Although
references were made to the oral confession by a witness and the
prosecuting attorney, there was no attempt made to introduce it as
evidence. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the writ-
ten confession only if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that it
was voluntary, and that although the delay in arraignment was not
conclusive, they might consider it in passing on the question of vol-
untariness. 12 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and the conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.'3
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, did not
consider the written confession but reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the oral confession was involuntary and coerced and
had been submitted to the jury in violation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 As pointed out by the dissent,15
the Court for the first time set aside the finding of the trial jury
and reweighed the conflicting evidence as to the alleged coercion.
The effect of this decision would seem to shackle the methods and
practices which may be employed by state law enforcement officers.
Restrictions which appear to be even more stringent than those
applied in state cases have been adopted by the Supreme Court in
considering criminal convictions in federal courts. Two cases,
McNabb v. United States16 and Anderson v. United States,17 both
decided in 1943 indicate that in federal cases the Supreme Court
will not be bound to a consideration of the due process question
alone. In the MeNabb case the defendants were arrested by officers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on suspicion of 'having 3murdered
an officer of that agency, but were not immediately taken before a
committing magistrate as required by federal statute. They were
held incommunicado for several days and questioned intermittently.
Their convictions based upon their confessions obtained as a result
of the questioning were reversed by the Supreme Court which held
inadmissible the confessions made by the accused while in illegal
custody even though the confessions themselves were not considered
involuntary, untrustworthy, or even "inherently coercive." Justice
Frankfurter, representing the majority of the court, reasoned that
in federal cases the reviewing power of the Court is not confined to
constitutionality, but rather that judicial supervision of the admin-
istration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining "civilized standards of procedure
and evidence". In the Anderson case the defendants were illegally
arrested by state officers on suspicion of having conspired to dyna-
mite government property. After "oeing questioned by both state
12 See People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934).
IS Conviction affirmed, 292 N. Y. 360, 55 N.E. (2d) 353 (1944),
remittitur amended, 292 N. Y. 686, 56 N.E. (2d) 106 (1944), rehearing
denied, 293 N. Y. 695, 56 N.E. (2d) 303 (1944).
14For reversal: Justices Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, Rutledge,
Murphy; dissent: Chief Justice Stone, Justices Roberts, Reed, Jackson.
5 - U. S. -. 65 S. Ct. 781, 790 (1945).
16 318 U. S. 332 (1943). Note (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1008.
17 318 U. S. 350 (1943).
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and federal officers they confessed and were then arraigned. The
Supreme Court held that although the conduct of the federal offi-
cers was not illegal, their collaboration with the state officers
tainted the evidence and rendered the confession inadmissible under
the principles announced in the McNabb case.
There was a decided reaction among members of the Bar against
the McNabb decision. At a meeting of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1943 to consider a preliminary draft of federal rules of crim-
inal procedure 8 there was overwhelming opposition expressed
against including in the rules a section embodying the effect of the
McNabb decision, and the section was omitted from the final draft.
Similar disapproval was expressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court
which refused to apply in state proceedings the rule which was an-
nounced in the McNabb decision for federal cases. The Arkansas
court said "... . we think the better rule to follow is .. . to make the
test of admissibility of a confession depend not upon when it was
made but upon whether it was voluntarily made ."19 Likewise,
a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, 20 bound by the rule of the
McNabb case,. used the following language in reversing a treason
conviction: "With all due deference to the Supreme Court, and
especially to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the author of those opinions,
we are constrained to state that we entertain grave doubts that this
recently promulgated rule of evidence will result in any improve-
ment to the administration of criminal justice. '21
Perhaps as a result of this widespread disapproval, the extreme
decision in the McNabb case has been somewhat modified by United
States v. Mitchell22 in which Justice Frankfurter, again speaking
for the majority, indicated that the true interpretation of the rule
laid down by the McNabb case should be that illegal detention of
the accused will invalidate his confession only when the detention
itself acts as an inducement.23
Thus, the Supreme Court has taken the position that it will scru-
tinize confessions used in state prosecutions for "inherently coer-
cive" circumstances which would make such evidence inadmissible;
and if such a confession is introduced the Court will set aside the
judgment of conviction even though there is other evidence sufficient
to sustain the conviction. In federal cases the Court will consider
not only the constitutional question of due process but also "civ-
ilized standards of procedure and evidence" and will hold inadmis-
sible any confession obtained before arraignment if the illegal de-
tention acts as an inducement.
Is Preliminary Draft of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, pre-
pared by Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5
(b) 19 State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W. (2d) 77 (1944). Of
course state courts are not bound by the McNabb decision, nor can the
Supreme Court apply "civilized standards" in reviewing state convic-
tions. The Court is limited in examining state convictions to the con-
stitutional question of due process.
20 United States v. Haupt 136 F. (2d) 661, (CCA 7th, 1943).
21 Id. at 671.
22 322 U. S. 65 (1944). Accused, suspected of housebreaking, con-
fessed immediately and spontaneously upon arriving at police station in
custody of arresting officers. The confession was held admissible in a
federal criminal prosecution although defendant was illegally detained
for eight days before arraignment.
23As pointed out by Justice Reed in a concurring opinion to the
Mitchell ease, there seemed to be no such qualification in the McNabb
opinion itself.
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Much of the severe handicap on law enforcement officers resulting
from these rules of restriction can and should be overcome by more
intelligent and persevering investigations of criminal cases by police
officers. Nevertheless, there are many crimes committed which can
be solved only by the confession of the criminal himself; and it
cannot be assumed that a criminal who is arrested after having
evaded police officers for some time will spontaneously confess his
guilt without police interrogation. An opportunity for a reasonable
period of interrogation seems indispensable in many instances. 24
Federal legislation to nullify the effect of the McNabb case by stat-
ing that a confession is not rendered inadmissible by the failure of
federal officers to arraign promptly has apparently failed.
2 5 Simi-
larly, according to the view now taken by the Supreme Court, legis-
lation specifically allowing police officers a certain length of time to
interrogate criminals before they are formally charged with a par-
ticular offense 26 would probably be declared unconstitutional.
Seemingly we are confronted with two possible alternatives. A
drastic step might be taken by way of compensating for the undue
advantage presently accorded accused persons as a result of the
foregoing Supreme Court decisions. Abolish the use of confessions
altogether and then, by constitutional amendment, modify the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to the extent of permitting the court
to compel an accused person to submit to a court room interroga-
tion prior to and at the time of trial. It is suggested, however, that
the more practical solution to the problem would be attained if the
Supreme Court were to see fit to backtrack from the strict "inher-
ently coercive" rule of the Ashcraft case in state proceedings as it
apparently did regarding the previously rigid McNabb opinion re-
specting "civilied standards" in federal cases.
24 See Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (1942) 118.
25 The bill, (H.R. 3690) introduced by Representative Hobbs in 1943,
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee but has not as yet been
returned.
26 Such legislation was suggested by the proposed "Arrest Act" of
Interstate Commission on Crime (1941) § 2.
